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Abstract
Walter Block's critique of my paper fails to address the main argument. It is that Ludwig
von Mises's support for laissez faire comes from a comparison of the systems recommended by
the ideologies of socialism, interventionism, and liberalism. Mises compares these systems
according to the criterion of their capacity to achieve the goal of satisfying material wants, which
is either explicit or implicit in the arguments made by those who subscribe to the ideologies. He
uses value-free economic reasoning to determine whether the systems recommended by the three
ideologies will achieve the goal. In this reply, I reaffirm this argument in the face of Block's
critique. In addition, I address two other arguments. The first is the implicit argument in Murray
Rothbard and Block that Mises erred because he failed to take account of all of the goals that
policy advocates might have in recommending a policy. I argue that he did not err. The second is
that Mises is a utilitarian, also advanced by Leland Yeager. I argue not only that he was not but
that he repudiated the idea that his support for laissez faire was based on utilitarian welfare
principles. The reply also answers some of Block's more specific criticisms of my paper.1. Introduction
Mises erred twice in thinking that he had provided a defense of laissez faire based on
value-free economics. First, when he discussed a market intervention, he did not realize that his
defense made the unwarranted assumption that he knew the preferences of those who are effected
by it. Second, partly because he made this unwarranted assumption, he failed to see that his
defense was based on the unanimity principle and/or "his utilitarianism." These are the major
deficiencies identified by Murray Rothbard in his 1976 paper. Contrariwise, I argued that
Rothbard failed in that paper to comprehend the true basis of Mises's defense of laissez faire and
that he attributed Mises with ideas, including the unanimity principle and utilitarianism, that he
did not have (Gunning, 2002). A careful reading of my paper shows that I made two claims about
Rothbard. First, Rothbard failed to identify Mises's principal argument for laissez faire. Mises's
argument was based on a comparison, using value-free economic reasoning, of arguments for
market intervention according to criteria that he claimed were either explicitly or implicitly
espoused by those who promoted the intervention. Second, Rothbard misinterpreted Mises's
analyses of the arguments against the particular interventionist policies that he cited in Mises's
work. In his comment on my paper, Walter Block chose to criticize my second claim, arguing
basically that I did not appreciate Rothbard's depth (Block, 2002). His argument amounts to an
effort to reaffirm Rothbard's critique of Mises's alleged error and his alleged utilitarianism.
In part two of this reply, I provide the textual support for my first claim which Block
writes was absent from my original paper. In parts three and four, I focus on what I take to be the
main assertions of both Rothbard and Block, as described in the introductory sentences above. In
part three, I argue that Mises did not believe or assume that he could know others' ends and,
therefore, did not err in this respect. In part four, I argue that the assertion that Mises was a
utilitarian contradicts what Mises himself wrote about the issue. In part five, I respond to several
minor points in Block's critique.
2. Mises's Defense of Laissez Faire as an Ideology Against Socialism and Interventionism
In my paper, I wrote: "Mises's argument that an economist could advocate laissez faire
and still remain value-free stemmed from his conception of the goal of economics." What was
that goal? Consider the following quotations from Mises's Human Action:
It is the task of history to describe the historical conditions which made such a crude doctrine popular.
Economics has another task. It must analyze both Marxian polylogism and the other brands of
polylogism formed after its pattern, and expose their fallacies and contradictions (Mises 1966, p. 75).
It is the task of scientific technology and therapeutics to explode errors in their respective fields. It is
the task of economics to expose erroneous doctrines in the field of social action. But if men do not
follow the advice of science, but cling to fallacious prejudices, these errors are reality and must be
dealt with as such (ibid., p. 93).
The main objective of praxeology and economics is to substitute consistent correct ideologies for the
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1See Joseph Salerno (1990, p. 28) for the special meaning that Mises attached to the concept of
social cooperation. 
I regard these quotes as additional support for my proposition that, for Mises, the goal of
economics is to show either that the ideologies are contradictory or erroneous or that the policies
promoted by those who hold the ideologies will not accomplish the aims that they believe the
policies will accomplish. The goal, or set of goals, of economics can be accomplished with
logical reasoning and judgments of relevance. Economics is logical reasoning about human
action (praxeology) applied to the evaluation of policy arguments in which an understanding of
human action under the conditions of the market economy (a private property system,
specialization, use of money, free enterprise) is needed.
According to Mises, economics is a set of logical deductions about "what is" in the sense
that the images it constructs must be relevant to the social facts one aims to describe. Ideology
goes beyond the study of things as they are. It is "about the ought, i.e., about the ultimate ends
which man should aim at in his earthly concerns" (ibid.: 178). Ideology can also be distinguished
from the broader concept of a world view, which is 
an interpretation of all things, and as a precept for action, an opinion concerning the best means for
removing uneasiness as much as possible...Religion, metaphysics, and philosophy aim at providing a
world view. They interpret the universe and they advise men how to act."(ibid., p. 178; Gunning, p. 3) 
Ideologies may be of many types. Let us follow Mises by dividing them into two classes: (1)
asceticism and (2) non-ascetic ideologies. Economics is irrelevant to asceticism. Mises focused
on those ideologies that claim to be about the attainment of earthly ends which he, more or less,
equated with progress. These "must pay heed to the fact that society is the great means for the
attainment of earthly ends."(ibid., p. 179, emphasis added) The term "society," or social
cooperation, has a meaning for Mises that may not be obvious to the ordinary reader. It refers to
a state of interaction characterized by specialization and the division of labor. In this state,
individuals can better achieve their material wants, or earthly ends.
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Because the policies advocated by the proponents of a non-ascetic ideology are concerned
with "earthly ends;" if we want to evaluate their policy arguments from a logical point of view,
we must use economics (ibid.: 182-4), which starts out by studying the social cooperation in the
market economy. In other words, we must understand the market economy's contribution to the
production of what ordinary people regard as material wealth. "[N]o appeal to any religious or
metaphysical dogmas and creeds can invalidate the theorems and theories concerning social
cooperation as developed by logically correct praxeological reasoning" (ibid., p. 180).
In Mises view, the goal of evaluating the arguments put forth by what we might call
non-ascetic ideologists is in accord with the spirit of the early economists. "In lecturing and
writing books, [the early economists] were eager to communicate to their fellow citizens the
results of their thinking. They tried to influence public opinion in order to make sound policies
prevail in the conduct of civic affairs."(ibid., p. 869)Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 3
What are the non-ascetic ideologies that Mises believes praxeology and economics will
help one assess? In a section of Human Action entitled "World View and Ideology," Mises
appears to answer this question by discussing political parties.
In the field of society's economic organization there are the liberals advocating private ownership of
the means of production, the socialists advocating public ownership of the means of production, and
the interventionists advocating a third system which, they contend, is as far from socialism as it is from
capitalism. In the clash of these parties there is again much talk about basic philosophical issues.
People speak of true liberty, equality, social justice, the rights of the individual, community, solidarity,
and humanitarianism. But each party is intent upon proving by ratiocination and by referring to
historical experience that only the system it recommends will make the citizens prosperous and
satisfied. They tell the people that realization of their program will raise the standard of living to a
higher level than realization of any other party's program. They insist upon the expediency of their
plans and upon their utility. It is obvious that they do not differ from one another with regard to ends
but only as to means. They all pretend to aim at the highest material welfare for the majority of
citizens(ibid., p. 183)
I take this to mean first that there are two or three ideologies: liberalism, socialism, and possibly
interventionism. Second, I take it to mean that each of these ideologies aims to satisfy and,
indeed, to progress in the satisfaction of, earthly ends. The first is consistent with the fact that
Mises published books on each of the ideologies mentioned (Mises, 1922, 1927, 1940).
An outstanding feature of the use of economics to achieve this goal is that while
economics is directly concerned with evaluating arguments relating to public policy, it may
nevertheless remain value free. This is because the logic of economic policy arguments can be
evaluated without bias or preconception.
[The] postulate of Wertfreiheit can easily be satisfied in the field of the aprioristic science – logic,
mathematics, praxeology [of which economics is a branch] – and in the field of the experimental
natural sciences. It is logically not difficult to draw a sharp line between a scientific, unbiased
treatment of these disciplines and a treatment distorted by superstition (ibid., p. 48) 
A policy argument can also be evaluated in terms of its relevance. Although most of Mises's
discussion of relevance concerns the task of doing history (e.g., ibid., p. 57-58), he points out in
his section of the "Procedure of Economics" that "the end of science is to know reality."
"Therefore, praxeology restricts its inquiries to the study of acting under those conditions and
presuppositions which are given in reality" (ibid.: 65). An evaluation on the basis of relevance
concerns whether conditions assumed by the proponent of a policy "are given in reality."
How does the argument that economics is value free square with Mises's strong liberalism
in human affairs and his advocacy of laissez faire? In discussing the procedure of building an
image of the pure market economy, he writes:
It is true that economists have drawn from their investigations the conclusion that the goals which most
people, practically even all people, are intent on attaining by toiling and working and by economic
policy can best be realized where the free market system is not impeded by government decrees. But
this is not a preconceived judgment stemming from an insufficient occupation with the operation of
government interference with business. It is, on the contrary, the result of a careful unbiased scrutinyDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 4
2In addition to the references in Human Action which I provided in my original paper, the
following may also be consulted: Mises 1991 [1962], p. 587-592 and Mises 1990, p. 300-301.
of all aspects of intervention.(ibid.: 238) 
Thus, as Mises sees it, the economist's conclusions about the market economy stem not from a
normative judgment but from the study of whether intervention has achieved peoples' goals.
Economics, according to Mises, shows that intervention fails to achieve "the goals that most
people, practically even all people, are intent upon attaining." It may appear that this is some kind
of utilitarian or unanimity criterion. It is not. This is evident from the fact that Mises has already
told us that the achievement of peoples' goals is also the aim expressed or implied by the non-
ascetic ideologies. In advocating the socialist, interventionist, or laissez faire systems, the major
non-ascetic ideologies aim to cause the material wants or "earthly ends" of practically all people
to be satisfied to an increasing degree.
In my paper, I used the term "progress" as a surrogate for "the attainment of earthly ends."
Mises himself sometimes referred to the goals that the socialists and interventionists want to
achieve as the former, sometimes the latter. I followed Mises in defining progress as the human
being's striving "after a greater and better supply of food, clothes, homes, and other material
amenities" (Gunning, p. 4; Mises 1966, 193).
Having presented this documentation in addition to that provided in part two of my
original paper, I now restate my interpretation. Mises's advocacy of laissez faire was based on his
comparison of that system with the systems advocated by those who subscribe to the ideologies
of socialism and interventionism, as opposed to liberalism. His basis for comparison was the
production and distribution of material goods, or satisfaction of earthly ends. Using value-free
economic reasoning, he deduced that laissez faire would outperform the two alternative systems
in this department because of the social cooperation that would be achieved under the conditions
of the market economy advocated by liberalism. From this point of view, laissez faire is
superior.
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3. Knowledge of Goals
Rothbard argued that Mises erred. Specifically, Rothbard believed that Mises's criticism
of the minimum wage was based on his assumption that the policy was not in the interest of the
workers. Since Mises could not know the interests of all the workers, reasoned Rothbard, he
must be using some kind of value judgment or welfare function. Mises erred in not recognizing
this. In his paper, Rothbard asserted that in some passages, Mises used a unanimity principle,
which is a welfare criterion that we usually associate with Pareto or Wicksell. Block reiterated
Rothbard's argument about Mises and asserted that my claim that Mises was innocent of this
error was not substantiated.
Rothbard and Block are wrong. In the cases in question, Mises does not claim to know
the goals of those affected by a policy; he assumes that he knows the goals of those who advocateDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 5
3My argument that Rothbard sought to promote an Austrian welfare function was stated on p. 19
of my earlier paper.
of the policy – i.e., of those who present the policy argument. Nor is there any reason to believe
that he errs in neglecting the possibility that the goals of the advocates might be different from
what he assumes; to assert otherwise is tantamount to assuming that his arguments in this realm
are not tightly reasoned which, as I pointed out in my paper, a close reading of his text reveals is
incorrect. Mises evaluates the policy arguments on the basis of whether the reasoning contained
in them is correct, in light of what economics reveals about social cooperation in the market
economy, given the goals that he assumes the policy advocates have. In my original paper, I
supported my interpretation with quotes from and references to passages in Human Action
(Gunning. P. 9-11). Professional corroboration is provided by Kirzner 1976, p. 82; White 1992,
p. 260; and Mises himself in his recollections (Mises 1978, p. 114).
Rothbard and Block are certainly correct to say that in the absence of the knowledge of
the goals of advocates of a particular policy, one could not properly claim that a policy is in their
interest. However, they are wrong to conclude that Mises attempted to evaluate a policy in this
sense; his aim in these exercises was to evaluate a policy argument, with respect to which the
goals of the proponents were assumed.
4. The Claim that Mises was a Utilitarian
Both Rothbard and Block claim that Mises supported laissez faire on utilitarian grounds.
Like the unanimity criterion, this was a particularly convenient claim for Rothbard, who sought
to promote an Austrian welfare function and a natural rights ethic.
3 For if Mises's support for
laissez faire policies was based on a utilitarian welfare function, Rothbard and his followers
would have some justification for a claim that Rothbard's work in building a welfare function
based on natural rights (i.e., his natural rights system of ethics) was an extension of Mises's use
of a utilitarian welfare function to advocate laissez faire. The claim, if correct, would also
support Block's assertion in the first paragraph of his paper that Rothbard and Mises are twin
giants "in the field of laissez faire studies."
I did not discuss Rothbard's claim about Mises's alleged utilitarianism at length because I
believed that I had already shown convincingly in part 2 of my paper that Mises's support for
laissez faire had a different source. I wrote merely that "Rothbard presents no evidence that
Mises, the citizen, is a utilitarian" (p. 15 of my manuscript). Block responds by writing that
Mises's utilitarianism is "well established" and that Mises never denied his alleged utilitarianism
(p. 11 of Block). He does not tell us why he believes this is well established or why Mises would
have to deny a position that he never claimed to hold in order to satisfy his post-humus
interpreters. In any case, the rationale that both Rothbard and Block use to deduce Mises's
utilitarianism is that Mises used the criterion of material wealth and earthly ends to support
laissez faire. Block did not appreciate my argument in part two of my earlier paper that Mises
used the criteria of material wealth and earthly ends (i.e., progress) to evaluate laissez faire,Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 6
4References to "Mises the utilitarian" or to "Mises, as a utilitarian," are scattered throughout the
paper. 
socialism and interventionism because these were the criteria that the ideological advocates of
these systems had employed.
Yeager's Assertion of Mises's Utilitarianism
Regardless of this, let us explore the question of whether Mises was a utilitarian. The
most recent proponent of this view is Leland Yeager (2000). In footnote 6 of my original paper, I
pointed out that Rothbard and Yeager have claimed that Mises is a utilitarian but that they
provide no argumentation for their case. I went on to assert that the latter supports his claims by
referring not to Mises's own position but to his discussion of various philosophical or ethical
positions held by others. More specifically, I wrote that Yeager refers to Mises's discussions of
the old liberals as if Mises's acknowledgment of the old liberals’ utilitarianism constitutes his
agreement with it as a basis for making judgments about laissez faire. Yet Mises does not himself
use the old liberal argument to support laissez faire. His support of laissez faire is based on
criteria that I described in part 2 of my original paper and in part 2 of this paper. More recently,
Yeager has published another paper that attempts more fully to document the claim. I now turn to
that paper. Yeager introduces his discussion with the claim that Mises "forthrightly and
courageously avowed utilitarian ethics in a hostile intellectual atmosphere" (ibid., p. 237).
4 He
goes on to write: "In some passages [in Human Action] Mises is quite explicit about his
utilitarianism" and "Mises presents a utilitarian case for democracy and classical liberalism"
(ibid., p. 238-239). However the fact that Mises presents a utilitarian case does not, by itself,
demonstrate that he is a utilitarian or that he uses utilitarianism to support a policy or a system.
None of the references or passages cited by Yeager unambiguously supports the claim that the
utilitarian position being presented was Mises's own position.
In some of the references, Mises is not explicit. One must interpret his meaning by first
comprehending the wider context, as presented in part 2 of this paper. For example, Yeager cites
a passage in Human Action where Mises maintains that "[f]lexibility of prices and wages is the
vehicle of adjustment, improvement, and progress. Those who condemn price and wage changes
as unjust are working against endeavors to make economic conditions more satisfactory"(ibid.:
239). Apparently, Yeager means to suggest that the terms "improvement," "progress," and
"satisfactory" imply a utilitarian ethic. However, there is nothing in the section from which this
quote is taken to suggest this. Mises does not elaborate on the meaning of these terms in this
section, but this does not warrant the use of this passage, standing alone, to support the view that
Mises employs utilitarianism as a kind of welfare function or ethical foundation to support price
flexibility. This passage is equally consistent with the view that Mises was debunking not a
particular policy but a policy argument, according to the interventionist criterion of earthly ends,
or progress. Yeager goes on to find evidence of Mises's utilitarianism in Mises's other writings.
Although he quotes Mises extensively, neither the quotations nor his argumentation necessarily
support the proposition that Mises employs a welfare function based on utilitarianism, or any
other variant of utilitarianism, as a basis for advocating laissez faire. They do support the positionDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 7
5In a recent private communication, Yeager considers my argument as hair-splitting. If one's goal
is to present a case for a utilitarian ethics, perhaps it is. However, if one's goal is to interpret Mises
correctly, the grounds for this disagreement are stated by Mises himself, as I show below.
6These include in the tradition Carl Menger, J. B. Clark, Eugen Bohm Bawerk, Frank Fetter, and
Frank Knight.
that Mises wrote that the old liberal utilitarians supported laissez faire on this basis. But whether
Mises himself did so is not demonstrated by Yeager's quotations and citations.
5 What Yeager
appears to do in his paper is to infer that Mises's exposition of the utilitarian position and his
praise for the old liberals who held it implies that he himself was a utilitarian.
Mises on Welfare Economics and Utilitarianism
A much stronger case against Yeager's interpretation could be made on the basis of
Mises's direct discussion of the issue. In Chapter 35 of Human Action, which I have recently
reread, Mises seems to explicitly deny any role at all for welfare economics and the utilitarian
class of welfare functions. Indeed, he writes that welfare economics amounts to an implicit denial
of economics, as it was handed down by the old liberals and modified by the best literary
neoclassical economists.
6 In light of Rothbard’s, Yeager’s, and now Block’s arguments; it is
necessary to quote Mises at length. These quotations should not only make clear that Mises’s
view of welfare economics is quite the opposite of that held by Rothbard in his 1956 paper but
also dispel any notion that Mises was a utilitarian. Mises begins with a statement that, in essence,
tells how the doctrines of the socialist and interventionist propagandists have failed due to their
bad economics. Rather than admit the failures, however, the propagandists have introduced the
“welfare principle.”
Propagandists must finally admit that the market economy....[f]rom day to day....increases the quantity
and improves the quality of products. It has brought about unprecedented wealth....But, objects the
champion of interventionism, it is deficient from what he calls the social point of view. It has not
wiped out poverty and destitution (Mises 1966, p. 833).
Instead of the allowing decisions about how to act to be based on the “profit principle” (i.e., to be
made by entrepreneurship) these propagandists want them to be made on the basis of the "welfare
principle." However, if we try to add content to this welfare principle by employing some
concept of utility that focuses on material well being, we quickly realize that for the “immense
majority of nonascetic people,” the profit principle leads to the market economy (ibid.). In other
words, we already know that the immense majority of human beings will better satisfy their non-
ascetic wants by means of the market economy than by means of some alternative system. He
goes on to write:
  We may try, for the sake of argument, to interpret the concept of welfare in such a way that
its acceptance by the immense majority of nonascetic people would be probable. The better we
succeed in these endeavors, the more we deprive the idea of welfare of any concrete meaning and
content. It turns into a colorless paraphrase of the fundamental category of human action, viz., the urgeDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 8
to remove uneasiness as far as possible. As it is universally recognized that this goal can be more
readily, and even exclusively, attained by social division of labor, men cooperate within the framework
of societal bonds. Social man as differentiated from autarkic man must necessarily modify his original
biological indifference to the well-being of people beyond his own family. He must adjust his conduct
to the requirements of social cooperation and look upon his fellow men’s success as an indispensable
condition of his own. From this point of view one may describe the objective of social cooperation as
the realization of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Hardly anybody would venture to
object to this definition of the most desirable state of affairs and to contend that it is not a good thing to
see as many people as possible as happy as possible.
All the attacks directed against the Bentham formula have centered around ambiguities or
misunderstandings concerning the notion of happiness; they have not affected the postulate that the
good, whatever it may be, should be imparted to the greatest number.
However, if we interpret welfare in this manner, the concept is void of any specific
significance. It can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization. It is a fact
that some of the defenders of Negro slavery contended that slavery is the best means of making the
Negroes happy and that today in the South many Whites sincerely believe that rigid segregation is
beneficial no less to the colored man than it allegedly is to the white man. The main thesis of racism of
the Gobineau and Nazi variety is that the hegemony of the superior races is salutary to the true
interests even of the inferior races. A principle that is broad enough to cover all doctrines, however
conflicting with one another, is of no use at all. But in the mouths of the welfare propagandists the
notion of welfare has a definite meaning. They intentionally employ a term the generally accepted
connotation of which precludes any opposition. No decent man likes to be so rash as to raise objections
against the realization of welfare. In arrogating to themselves the exclusive right to call their own
program the program of welfare, the welfare propagandists want to triumph by means of a cheap
logical trick. They want to render their ideas safe against criticism by attributing to them an appellation
which is cherished by everybody. Their terminology already implies that all opponents are ill-
intentioned scoundrels eager to foster their selfish interests to the prejudice of the majority of good
people.
The plight of Western civilization consists precisely in the fact that serious people can resort
to such syllogistic artifices without encountering sharp rebuke. There are only two explanations open.
Either these self-styled welfare economists are themselves not aware of the logical inadmissibility of
their reasoning; or they have chosen this mode of arguing purposely in order to find shelter for their
fallacies behind a work which is intended beforehand to disarm all opponents. In each case their own
acts condemn them.
There is no need to add anything to the disquisitions of the preceding chapters concerning
the effects of all varieties of interventionism. The ponderous volumes of welfare economics have not
brought forth any arguments that could invalidate our conclusions. The only task that remains is to
examine the critical part of the welfare propagandists’ work, their indictment of the market economy.
All this passionate talk of the welfare school ultimately boils down to three points. Capitalism
is bad, they say because there is poverty, inequality of incomes and wealth, and insecurity(ibid., p.
833-835, emphasis added).
In short, Mises dismisses welfare economics based on utilities of individuals as either an exercise
in which the welfare economists are unaware of the mistakes in their reasoning or an effort to
mask their interventionist propagandizing. Referring to the first possibility, the error is due to
their implicit denial that there are mutual benefits of exchange and the market system. To ask
what economic policy a government should adopt by employing the framework of welfare
economics is like asking what policy a lifeguard should adopt to help an olympic swimmer avoid
drowning, given the assumption that the swimmer cannot swim.
This is a severe criticism indeed. Moreover, since Mises does not cite a specific work in
the field of theoretical welfare economics, a reader might readily disregard these statements onDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 9
7See Bergson 1938, Samuelson 1947, and J. de V. Graaff 1967: 4-10.
the grounds of Mises's alleged passionate advocacy of laissez faire. I shall argue, on the contrary,
that Mises's attack not only is justified but that it helps one provide a reasonable interpretation of
the fate of this episode in the history of professional economic thought. 
The Fate of Welfare Economics
I shall argue that the error that Mises asserts is not a necessary consequence of theoretical
welfare economics but that it accurately reflects the way this field of study ultimately developed.
Welfare economics was introduced (in the 1920s and 1930s) as professional economists sought
to apply the economics of Marshall, as transmitted through his successor at Cambridge A.C.
Pigou (1920), to the task of evaluating market intervention policies. The starting point was a
welfare economics based on the Benthamite principle of utility. According to this approach, the
task of the policy analyst was to predict the effects of a particular policy on individual utilities
and to compare them with the utilities the individuals would experience in the absence of the
policy. If the sum of the positive and negative utilities due to a policy was greater than zero, the
policy was said to be acceptable. Under this scheme, two different economists might fully agree
on the material effects of a policy but disagree on whether a policy is, in net, beneficial. This
could occur either if they attribute different utilities to the affected individuals or if they use a
different scale to weigh the positives against the negatives.
The utility approach to policy evaluation was not sufficient for some economists. They
sought to introduce non-utility criteria into the equation. Among these were the reduction of
poverty, reduction of inequality, providing security, and social justice. These economists needed
a more comprehensive concept to describe their criteria. Coincident with the growing use of
mathematics in welfare economics, the economists came to use the term “welfare function” to
refer to the broader concept.
7 Those who considered only utility in their policy analysis were said
to take a narrower view of welfare than the others. We might say that the former adopted a
utilitarian welfare function. Within the set of utilitarian welfare functions was the Pareto welfare
function, which demands that a policy at least not reduce the utility of anyone. Outside the
utilitarian set, any concept of goodness could be employed.
So long as one approaches the task of evaluating an interventionist policy argument from
within the set of utilitarian welfare functions, and so long as he practices his craft properly; he
would be unlikely to disregard the benefits of the market economy. One who evaluated a
particular market intervention would aim to compare the utilities of the individuals that he
presumed would exist in the absence of the policy with those that he presumed would exist if the
policy was adopted. It is true enough that utilities cannot be measured and that a policy analyst
cannot be certain that utilities would be higher under one set of circumstances than under
another. It is not being argued here that “utilitarian welfare economics” could avoid such
problems as the interpersonal comparison of utilities. The point is only that one who uses this
framework competently is unlikely to disregard the utilities that would exist in the absence of any
policy intervention whatever – i.e., the utilities that would presumably be generated through
market interaction.Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 10
For those who advocated a shift to a broader welfare economics, disregarding market
benefits was easier. In particular, to some proponents, theoretical welfare economics became a
means of turning the science of economic interaction into a type of engineering. Just as the
engineer sets out the alternative methods of production without judging which method of
production is best (because he does not know the prices of the factors of production), so also can
the economist set out the alternative means of achieving certain social goals – if the goals are
supplied to him by those who demand to know the alternatives. Just as the engineer is ordinarily
the servant of some businessperson; the economist, in this image, should become the servant of a
government. In ordinary language, the policy economist could say: “If you will clearly specify the
goal, or goals, that you want a policy to achieve; we will be happy to analyze the alternative
policies, ranking them in terms of their capacity to achieve those goals.” One of the popular
applications of this mode of thinking was the Phillips curve. The textbooks proclaimed:
“Scientific analysis informs us of the tradeoff between aggregate unemployment and inflation.
But we cannot choose which is best. We need a leader, or politics, to do this.”
One who adopts this point of view need not disregard the utilities that individuals receive
from the market economy. However, a student whose understanding of the market economy is
not strong or who learns welfare economics before he begins to study market economy
interaction may easily be persuaded that the question of whether the laissez faire, socialist or
interventionist system is best from the standpoint of people's utilities, earthly ends, or progress is
unsettled. The same is true for a non-economist who recognizes the importance of "consulting
the experts" but also who reserves the right to make up her own mind on the issue of which
system is best. In an economics profession that has moved away from the study of history of
economic thought, the result could be a kind of institutional forgetting of the very principles on
which the science was built.
Theoretical welfare economics has not fared well as a field within the economic
profession. The notion that the new welfare economics could provide help in evaluating policy
was ultimately overwhelmed by a combination of (a) social choice theory which pointed to the
futility of trying to identify a practical means of translating individual utilities, by means of
collective choice rules, into a usable social welfare function (Arrow, 1951; Riker, 1982); (b)
public choice theory which provided reasons to think that even if one could employ theoretical
welfare economics to determine the best policy, not only was it unlikely to be adopted in a
democracy because of incentives to mislead and to seek “rents,” if it was adopted, it was unlikely
to be administered efficiently (Gunning 2003); and (c) questions about whether the empirical
findings of the past were sufficiently repeatable to be a guide for policy. Nevertheless, one legacy
of theoretical welfare economics has survived and is present in every widely used modern
economics textbook. These textbooks begin with the assertion that economists ought to maintain
a clear distinction between (1) the choice of values and (2) the analysis of the effects of a policy.
Rothbard's Critique in Perspective
In light of recent developments in professional economics, we can summarize Mises's
view as follows. Mises asserted that every socialist, interventionist, and liberalist aimed to assure
the satisfaction of material wants (or earthly ends) and to achieve progress (as he defined it). He
argued further that interaction under the conditions of the market economy accomplishes theseDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 11
8To see the substantial difference between Mises and Rothbard, consider the following Rothbard
statement from his Man, Economy and State: 
Praxeology, through its wertfrei laws, informs us that the workings of the voluntary principle and of the free
market lead inexorably to freedom, prosperity, harmony, efficiency, and order; while coercion and government
intervention lead inexorably to hegemony, conflict, exploitation of man by man, inefficiency, poverty and
chaos. At this point, praxeology retires from the scene; and it is up to the citizen – the ethicist – to choose his
political course according to the values that he holds dear (Rothbard, 1962, 880-881). 
As Mises viewed the matter, the "ethicist" – or, in Misesian terms, the proponent of an ideology
concerned with non-ascetic ends – had already expressed or implied his desire that "most people,
practically all people" attain their ends. It is for this reason that praxeological economics need not "retire
goals. For this reason, the study of social cooperation in the market economy is the starting point
of economics. The socialist who asserts that the market system should be abolished and replaced
by a planned socialist system is a poor economist because he does not comprehend the teachings
of economics. By the same token, the interventionist who employs a broad social welfare
function while disregarding the benefits of laissez faire to the people does not comprehend these
teachings. Also by the same token, the writer of a principles of economics text who begins by
trying to separate value judgments from analysis is giving evidence that his understanding is
deficient. From the viewpoint of Mises’s praxeological economics, modern theoretical welfare
economics, socialism, and the engineering-oriented textbook writer, are likely to depreciate the
traditional teachings of economics that began with the old liberal utilitarians and were modified
and improved by the various literary neoclassical economists [who were not utilitarians, although
Mises did not emphasize this].
In my original paper, I alleged that Rothbard's misinterpretation might have been due to
his “acceptance of the tenets of modern welfare economics” (Gunning, p. 20). Block objects that,
“to add insult to injury, [Gunning interprets] Rothbard as some sort of mathematical economist
who focuses only on equilibrium states at the expense of market process....”(Block, p. 15) I
neither wrote nor implied anything about equilibrium or market process. My main claim is that
Rothbard's work is in one way like that of the modern welfare economists who claimed that a
welfare function – one that might include goals like inequality, providing security, and social
justice – is necessary to evaluate policy.  Just as these welfare economists distract our attention
from the market economy and suggest that the study of other systems may be more worthwhile
than the history of economics would suggest, so does Rothbard's distract our attention. His
implicit message is that we need pay little attention to the history of economics and that we
should focus on the development of a natural rights ethic in order to defend laissez faire. A
subsidiary claim is that Rothbard was led to misinterpret Mises because he had implicitly been
persuaded by the Samuelsonian-type welfare economics which sees economic science as a kind
of engineering.
How would Mises have answered Rothbard's critique (Block, p. 13)? By pointing out that
Rothbard misunderstood his argument and by writing that laissez faire could be supported by
showing that the socialists and interventionists could not achieve the nonascetic goals they
claimed they would achieve – material wealth, earthly ends, progress.
8 Moreover, it could oftenDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 12
from the scene." Indeed, to achieve its goal, it must remain on center stage. The economist can advocate
laissez faire as the system in which the aims of every non-ascetic ethicist are most likely to be achieved.
The quoted passage is reprinted in and taken from White 1992, p. 251.
be shown that the goals that advocates of a particular interventionist policy expressed could not
be achieved through the policy they advocated.
Conclusion
Thus, Rothbard and Block (and probably Yeager) appear to be completely wrong about
Mises's utilitarianism. One suspects that the error is due to their acceptance of the value
judgment-analysis distinction that stems from theoretical welfare economics. Let me summarize
this position in somewhat greater detail than I have done to this point.
Mises asserted that the old liberals advocated laissez faire on the basis of utilitarian
principles. Their utilitarianism also provided the first steps in the direction of a scientific
economics and helped to lead Mises himself to the insight that economics is a branch of
praxeology. In conjunction with his formally working out the methods of praxeology and
economics, Mises became convinced that a modified presentation of economic reasoning, first
introduced by the old liberal utilitarians, was value-free. He went on to employ this value-free
reasoning to evaluate the ideologies of socialism and interventionism and a number of specific
policy arguments. He saw such evaluations as the primary goal of economics. He evaluated the
ideologies by focusing on a particular set of goals that he asserted was explicitly or implicitly
claimed in the ideologies, namely, the production of material wealth, achievement of earthly
ends, progress, etc. These goals were similar if not identical to those of the utilitarians. He went
on to employ value-free economic reasoning to support his argument that the systems of
socialism and of interventionism would not be capable of achieving these goals. Using the same
reasoning, he deduced that these goals can be achieved by laissez faire, which is the system
advocated by the old liberals and utilitarians. In addition, Mises evaluated specific
interventionist policies on the basis of whether they would achieve goals that he assumed the
advocates of the policies had.
5. Specific Responses to Block
I end this paper with a list of shorter replies to specific comments made by Block in his
paper.
1. Neither I nor Mises, whom I cited, anthropomorphized (Block, p. 2). We merely employed a
linguistic convention. I used the term "goal of economics" to refer to the "goals of economists" in
more or less the same way as Mises.Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 13
9It is true that I wrote: "We must conclude that Rothbard's claim that Mises used a 'variant of the
unanimity principle' is not supported by the text he quoted" (Gunning, 11). I did not mean by this,
however, that the Mises text supports a claim that he used some other welfare principle. My broader
claim was that the text fails to support the claim that Mises used any welfare principle. Rothbard erred in
thinking that the Misesian text had anything at all to do with welfare economics or ethics.
2. Block's verbal exercise of inserting "some of" or "all of" into Mises's statements (Block, p. 3-
5) does not address the only points I attempted to make. My first point is that Mises was not
writing about an ethical principle at all in these statements but about the task of determining
whether a policy would achieve the goals that its advocates (whether all or some) wanted them to
achieve. Accordingly, it does not matter whether we insert "some of" or "all of" into the
statements.
9 My second point is that although Rothbard began his critique by saying that Mises's
used a variant of the unanimity principle, Rothbard's actual critique was based instead on his
argument that Mises could not know the goals of the policy advocates. 
3. I do not "rely" on Larry Eshelman's paper (Block, p. 6). I merely cite his paper as having made
an argument similar to mine about Mises's alleged utilitarianism.
4. My claim in note 5 of my paper, which is a peripheral to a peripheral, is that Mises did not
disregard people with high time preference, as Rothbard implied; moreover, taking them into
account (or disregarding them) is not relevant to Mises's advocacy of laissez faire. Rothbard's
misinterpretation is an extension of his misplaced claim that in commenting on policy, Mises
disregarded the preferences of some of the individuals.
Incidentally, I agree that "Mises nowhere specifically states 'that economics is only
concerned with long-run interests'"(Block, p. 9) I did not mean to say that he did. A closer
reading of my text will indicate that in spite of some imprecision, this is not my meaning.
5. Block suggests that my mention of the goals of earthly ends, economic progress, and food,
clothes, homes and other material amenities is evidence that I took a "turnabout," implying that I
acknowledged Mises's alleged utilitarianism after all (Block, p. 11). Yet I very clearly indicated
these goals as being the criteria used by the socialist and interventionist ideologies that Mises
critiqued.
6. Conclusion
Surely, neither Rothbard nor Block misrepresented Mises’s views deliberately. They
simply disregarded Mises's discussion of ideologies (as described above) and Mises's discussion
of welfare economics, as described in part 4 of this paper. There is a good explanation for
Rothbard's error. His plan was to attract students to a natural rights ethical system, or welfare
function, that he believed could be used not only to evaluate laissez faire but also every public
policy. He advocated what amounts to an Austrian welfare economics. Quite correctly, he saw
Mises's claim that a laissez faire system could be supported on the basis of value-free economicsDid Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 14
as an obstacle to fulfilling this plan. The explanation for Block’s error appears to be to twofold:
(1) to defend his old Mises Institute colleague Rothbard and (2) to support his claim that Mises
and Rothbard are twin giants of economics. Unfortunately for both, they misinterpreted Mises.Did Mises Err? Was He a Utilitarian? 15
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